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THE TREND TOWARDS THE "DENATIONALIZATION"
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
EDWARD SOFEN
There is reason to believe, and seriously to consider, that the majority in
the United States Supreme Court as reconstituted by the addition of its newly
appointed members I is, under the leadership of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, un-
doing the r'evolution in the "nationalization" of civil liberties that has been
taking place since 1920. The principle at stake is the Court's interpretation of
those fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
One could detect signs of the Court's tendency to move in this direction as
early as 1941 in the Meadowm oor case.2 Here the question that the majority
sought to answer was whether a state court could issue an injunction to enjoin
acts of pickets which in themselves were peaceful. It was felt that because of
the early history of this particular dispute, the picketing still carried with
it al implied threat of violence and that therefore the forbiddance of such
picketing did not infringe upon the Fourteenth Amendment. What was es-
pecially significant about tile case was the Court's refusal to make any in-
dependent evaluation of the testimony in the case. Tile majority declared that
the Court would not intrude upon the realm of policy making by substituting
its own judgment for that of the state courts.
This analhronistic bit of reasoning brings to mind Frank v. Mangum 3
and other such decisions I rendered prior to 1920 when due process had come
to guarantee only property rights 5 and had not yet reached the point of pro-
tecting civil liberties. The opinion of tile majority in the Frank case in 1915
paralleled that of the Court inl the %ery famous Slaughtcr-House Cases., In
that historic decision Mr. Justice Miller had revealed less concern over the in-
tention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and more of his faith in
our dual system of government in general, and in the maintenance of the
sovereignty of the states in particular. He had feared that the consequences of
nationalizing the "Bill of Rights" would he to substitute Congressional discre-
tion for state legislation, and to "constitute the court as a perpetual censor upon
all legislative rights of citizens." Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority
* Instructor in Government, University of Miami.
I. Those members appointed to the Court since 1945.
2. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
3. 237 U. S. 309 (1915).
4. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581(1900).
5. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry, Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S 266 (1897).
6. 16 Wallace 36 (U. S. 1873).
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in the Frank case, reiterated this fear of Mr. Justice Miller by declaring that
we would destroy the harmonious relationship existing between the state and
Federal Governments if we were to subject the administration of justice in the
state courts to the constant supervision of the federal courts. He concludes
therefore that the decision of the state's highest court, which had examined
the facts objectively in a completely uniased atmosphere, Must be taken as
final.
However, Justices Holmes and Hughes took issue with the majority on
this point and thus presaged the future. They maintained that when a (Iuestion
of fact becomes the conclusive factor as to the determination of a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, it is the duty of the federal courts to re-
examine such facts. It appeared to both dissenting justices that from the evi-
dence submitted there could be no doubt but that the jury in the making of
its decisions in this case had responded to the passions of the mob. Beginning
with the Moore case 7 in 1923, the Court itself declared in effect that it would
reexamine the findings of even the highest state court to ascertain whether
constitutional guarantees had been violated. Any consideration of the iany
cases that have since followed in the wake of the Moore decision would lead
one to conclude that this issue had been laid to final rest.
The recent decision of Carter v. Illinois,s however, belies any such con-
clusion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of five, now declared
that the Court could not consider factors like "the racial handicap of the de-
fendant, his mental capacity, his inability to make an intelligent choice [or his]
precipitancy in tile acceptance of a plea of guilty" 11 because they were not
in the common law record, which was all that had been placed before the
Supreme Court of Illinois. Thus not only did the Supreme Court of Illinois
refuse to go beyond the record, an allowable fact according to Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, but so, too, did the Supreme Court of the United States.
Recent decisions have also rescinded other guarantees heretofore asserted
by the Court to be part of the protection of the diue process clause. In the
Powell case 10 in 1932 the Court had stated:
Even the intelligent and educated layman . . . lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
In a whole series of such cases the Court had seen fit to demand that adequate
counsel be assigned to persons charged with serious crimes. In White v.
7. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S..86 (1923).
8, 329 U. S. 173 (1947).
9. 329 U. S. 173, 179 (1947).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
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Ragen,) for example, it ruled that a defendant on trial upon a serious
criminal charge and unable to defend himself was denied his constitutional
right to a fair trial when deprived of effective assistance of counsel. This
right was extended even further when in another case 12 Mr. Justice Black
stated for the Court that even where a defendant pleaded guilty he was still en-
titled to the benefits of counsel despite the fact that he had not reqoested
such counsel. He reasoned that it was sufficient to know that a defendant
charged with a serious offense was incapable of defending himself adequately.'
At about the same time in the Williams case 1 it was held that a layman needs
the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of over-zealous prosecutors or of his
own ignorance or bewilderment. It did not seem to be an unwarranted as-
sertion to students of constitutional development to conclude that the Court
was incorporating that part of the Sixth Amendment which provides for
counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation upon the states.
The Court, however, departing from the logic of such decisions, has re-
cently reverted to Betts v. Brady 15 for a defense of its position. In that strange
decision the Court oddly enough held that appointment of counsel was not a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial. At that time Mr. Justice Black, speak-
ing for the dissent, declared that practices which subjected innocent persons to
increased dangers of conviction because of their poverty could not be recon-
ciled with our fundamental concepts of fairness and decency. From 1943 to
1947 Betts v. Brady was never cited by the Supreme Court as controlling
and it appeared as if the Court had repented for its action in that case. In
1947, however, Mr. Justice Black once again had occasion to condemn severely
the decision of the Betts case which was resurrected in Foster v. Illinois,"'
The majority held in the latter case that it was not for the Court to suggest the
desirability of offering aid of counsel to every accused person who wished to
plead guilty. A brief examination of the facts involved in this case might help
to explain the strong conflict of opinioii between the majority of five and
the minority of four. The accused, Foster, had been charged with burglary and
larceny and, after being handed a copy of the indictment, had been arraigned.
The minority maintained that the technical aspects of pleading guilty to crimes
involving penalties of anywhere from one year to life necessitated having
skills far beyond those possessed by any layman. Mr. Justice Rutledge con-
demned a "presumption of regularity" where the records disclosed that in-
11. 324 U, S. 760 (1945).
12. Rice v. Olsen, 324 U. S. 786 (1945).
13. See also House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945). Here the defendant, a young, un-
educated man, who was a stranger in the town was forced to plead guilty within a few
minutes after receiving a copy of the information in the absence of his attorney.
14. Williams v. Kaiser,'323 U. S. 471 (1945). See also Tompkins v. State of
Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945), expressing the same view.
15. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
16. 332 U. S. 134 (1947).
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digent and ignorant persons unable to afford legal aid were denied the basic
rights of counsel. He believed that the courts owed more than a negative duty
to the protection of fundamental rights.
The common denominator that one detects in these cases decided by the
1947 term of the Court is a decided aversion on the part of the majority to
upsetting state decisions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has gone so far as to urge
that the Due Process Clause not be made "a destructive dogma in the ad-
ministration of systems of criminal justice" which might "open wide the
prison doors of the land." 17 The criterion appears to be not whether a man's
constitutional liberties had been violated, but rather that of administrative
expediency. Mr. Justice Black replied to this contention of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter with the flat declaration that even prison doors must be opened if con-
stitutional rights have been infringed. The setting up of legal technicalities in
the Carter 18 and Gaves cases "I as justification for what Mr. Justice Murphy
has referred to as a "pretense of ignoring plain facts . . . upon which a man's
very life or liberty could depend," 20 certainly bodes stormy weather for civil
liberties in a time of reaction where liberties are being menaced on every side.
It was this state of affairs and the refusal of the Court once again to include
tinder the protection of due process, the right against self-incrimination,2 1
that caused Mr. Justice Black to declare, "We cannot know what Bill of Rights
provision will next be attenuated by the Court. We can at least be sure that
there will be more, so long as he Court adheres to the doctrine of this [Foster
case] and the Adamson case." 22
Indeed, a logical extension of the Frankfurter philosophy of allowing lo-
calities to use their own discretion in the settlement of local problems might,
now that this viewpoint has become pretty much that of the majority, affect
the entire concept of freedom of speech and religion. A brief review of the
reasoning of the then dissenters in cases involving freedom of speech and re-
ligion might help to clarify the position of this newly formed majority. In
Martin v. Struthers 23 the Court struck down a municipal ordinance which
forbade "any person to knock on doors, ring doorbells, or otherwise summon
to the door occupants of any residence for the purpose of distributing to them
handbills or circulars." Mr. Justice Black declared for the Court that freedom to
distribute information to every citizen whenever he might desire to receive it
was clearly vital to the preservation of a free society. This was as significant,
17. Id. at 139.
18, Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1947).
19. Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (1947).
20. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 183 (1947).
21. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
22. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 140 (1947).
23. 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
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he asserted, for political and labor activities as for religious activities. Mr.
Justice Murphy was prompted to announce:24
It is our proud achievement to have demonstrated that unity and
strength are best accomplished not by enforced orthodoxy of views but by
diversity of opinion through the fullest possible means of freedom of con-
science and thought.
Justices Frankfurter and Reed dissented on the grounds that it was per-
fectly proper for a state legislature to decide that its citizens did not wish to
tolerate such annoyances. The dissent raised the issue once more of the right
of localities to settle their own local problems as they see fit. Mr.*Justice Jackson
also took the majority of the Court to task for the decision in this particular
case. In his dissent, too, in the Douglas case,2 5 Mr. Justice Jackson scoffed at
high constitutional principles which permitted Jehovah's Witnesses to come to
the threshold of a nian's home and thrust upon him literature calling his church
a "whore" and his faith a "racket." Such undesirable practices he could only
see as a very questionable use of religious freedoni. 2' He concludes as fol-
lows :27
I should think that the singular persistence of the turmoil about Je-
hovah's Witnesses, one which would seem to result from the work of no
other sect, would suggest to this Court a thorough examination of their
methods to see if they impinge unduly on the rights of others. Instead of
that, the Court has in one way after another, tied the hands of all local
authority and made the aggressive methods of this group the law -of the
land2
It would seem that Mr. Justice Jackson reverses his position in the Barnette
case 29 where he had observed that, "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied in the court." 3o In this particular instance it
would appear that lie was now willing to place such fundamental liberties
within the reach of majorities and officials of local governments so that they
might exercise their police powers.
The Court has not tied the hands of local authorities in dealing with
24. Id. at 150.
25. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 159 (1943).
26. id. at 175, where Mr. Justice Jackson quotes from CHAFF., FREEDOM OF SPEEcH
Is THE UNITD STAins 407: "1 cannot help wondering whether the Justices of the Su-
preme Court are quite aware of the effect of organized front-door intrusions upon people
who are not sheltered from zealots and imposters by a staff of servants or the locked en-
trance of an apartment house."
27. Id. at 181.
28. The right of Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute religious literature to the public
may not be restricted by a locality simply because such locality is a privately owned
company town or a federal housing oroject, regardless of state laws or regulations to the
contrary. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 50t (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S.
517 (1946).
2N. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
30. Id. at 638.
"DENATIONALIZATION" OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
actual breaches of the peace as seen in the Cox 31 and Chaplinsky 32 cases. In
this respect the Jehovah's Witnesses were held to have the same liability as
any other persons of the community. Nevertheless an ordinance prohibiting
canvassing, which might prevent distasteful intrusions, might also destroy a
very fundamental right of expression. To say that the American people must
leave it to legislative wisdom to decide whether or not to restrict such freedom
is to miss the real meaning of democracy. Whatever else it means, democracy
implies in addition to majority rule the protection of the rights and privileges
of the minority. In the realin of civil liberties the Supreme Court stands as a
symbol of protection against the encroachment by the majority upon the
rights of a minority.
It might be worthwhile here to examine the basis of difference between
the majority and minority opinions of the Court in recent years. The Frank-
furter viewpoint expresses the belief that local problems may best be solved
by the community in which they arise, and that it is not for the Supreme
Court to interfere with this legislative discretion." Mr. Justice Jackson in
the Fay case 94 has even gone so far as to make analogous the Court's present
position with that of the Holnes and Brandeis school. The question arises,
then, whether both these schools of thought really are the same. The answer,
in the writer's opinion, must be in the negative.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis had applied this kind of reasoning to cases
where the Court had struck down legislation aimed at eliminating some of
the inequities of our society. : - Certainly one cannot compare legislation which
limits hours of labor of women and children or regulates public utilities with
legislation which prohibits an individual from expressing his opinion to other
individuals, or denies to him adequate counsel when lie is. fighting for his very
life and freedom. Such a right becomes too fundamental to entrust to a local
31. Cox v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 569 (1941). The 'Court upheld the state law
which subjected to a fine anyone who failed to procure a license for any parade or pro-
cession even when this was applied to the Jehovah's Witnesses. The defendants had
marched in groups from fifteen to twenty in close single files along the sidewalk of a
crowded business district carrying placards-with informational inscriptions.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 568 (1942). Held, that the appellations
"damned racketeer" and "damned fascist" would provoke a breach of the peace.
33. Professor Commager defends the Frankfurter position as being in the best
traditions of Jeffersonion democracy. CONIAIcAR AND STEEFL, MAJORITY RULE AND
MINORITY RIGHTS (1943). For a reply to Commager's contentions, see Boudin, Majority
Rule and Constitutional Limitations, 4 L.Aw. GUILD Ri:v. 1 (March-April 1944).
34. Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261 (1947).
35. A keen analysis of this problem is presented by Prof. Samuel Konefsky in his
recently published work on Chief Justice Stone wherein he states: "It is in the civil
liberty sphere that Justice Stone would draw a distinction between the Court's limited
role in reviewing legislation affecting business activities and its much more penetrating
scrutiny of measures which operate to repress 'freedom of the human mind and spirit.'
Fundamentally this contrast was implicit in the Holmes-Brandeis theory of toleration of
legislation. Justice Holmes deviated more frequently than did 'Brother Brandeis.' But,
though he deferred to the legislative judgment more often than not, neither Justice
hesitated to restrain the legislature when he was convinced that 'liberty of the mind' was
at stake." KONFFSKY. 'CilIEF JUSTICE STONF AND TIME SUPREME COURT 269 (1945). See
Kent, Book Review, 2 MIAM L. Q. 251 (19481.
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majority which is, after all, but a small minority of all the people of the United
States. "The appeal is. therefore, to the Bill of Rights which represents the
will of a majority of the entire nation, and to the Supreme Court as the repre-
sentative of tile entire nation, to reverse, in the name of the majority of our
people, a local legislature and a local court, who have because of some local
prejudice or local interests defied the will of the entire nation as expressed in
the Constitution." :11 One might go even a step further than Mr. Boudin and
argue that even the majority of the people of the nation has no right to trans-
gress upon the liberties of the minority. They are protected from the majority
by having been placed in the Constitution and can be changed only by the
amending process. The Supreme Court has the sacred duty of protecting
such fundamental freedoms from majority and minority alike.
Part of the great controversy within the Court in recent years has been
the struggle of the dissenting justices today to have the majority accept the
Fourteenth Amendment as the embodiment of the "Federal Bill of Rights."
This was first brought to life by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy in Bells
v. Brady 7 and has been a bone of contention in the most recently decided
cases. The minority insists that it was the intention of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include the Bill of Rights in that amendment, a
conclusion concurred in by this writer in his report on the "Nationalization of
Civil Liberties." The majority position can best be explained by examining
the Palko case.," In that celebrated opinion Mr. Justice Cardozo had stated that
the inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment of some of the privileges and
immunities guaranteed by the Federal Bill of Rights was based on the belief
of the Court that neither liberty nor justice could exist without them. On the
other hand, he explained that the exclusion of certain of its immunities was
similarly based on an appreciation of the essential implication of liberty and
not upon any arbitrary reasoning. In the Malinski decision 311 and in its most
recent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed, its faith in this construction of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly in the Adamson
case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a separate opinion, in reply to Mr. Justice
Black, denied that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant historically to in-
elude the Bill of Rights. He drew largely from judicial sources and argued that
the most distinguished jurists in the history of the Court had held this
position. They were "mindful of the relation of our federal system to a pro-
gressively democratic society and therefore duly regardful of the scope of
authority that was left to the States ever after the Civil War." 40
There is a difference of opinion even among the dissenting justices as to
36. Bou Di N, op. cit. supra note 33, at 11.
37. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
38. Palkp v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
39. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1935).
40. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 62 (1947),
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what the Due Process Clause should mean. Justices Murphy and Rutledge
agree with Justices Black and Douglas that it should contain the "Bill of
Rights," but they do not want to prevent the Court from including additional
guarantees within the concept of due process. It is the opinion of this writer
that the controversy about the Fourteenth Amendment and its relationship
to the Bill of Rights ordinarily would have been an academic question if the
majority of the Court had not refused to ignore fundamental rights included in
the first eight amendments. It would make very little difference to posterity
whether the rights under the first eight amendments were included within
the concept of due process because of being part of the "code of civilized
standards," or as part of the "Bill of Rights." I agree that the Fourteenth
Amendment should not be limited to the "Bill of Rights," because freedom
is too vital and dynamic a concept to be forever fixed by any immutable laws.
To this degree I would concur with the present majority, but I am unable to
conclude that due process could not continue to have these qualities even
with the inclusion of the Bill of Rights. As a matter of fact I am inclined to
believe that its inclusion would strengthen and give meaning to the founda-
tion upon which due process rests. At the very least it would assure a minimum
number of specifically enumerated guarantees that would not be dependent
upon the whims of the justices. I would agree with Mr. Justice Murphy that the
"natural law" theory of exclusion and inclusion degrades the constitutional
safeguards of the Bill of Rights, and actually forces the Court to pass on
legislative wisdom.
The freedoms of the Bill of Rights, no more than the freedoms of the
Fourteenth Amendment need not be fixed and immutable, despite the few in-
flexible requirements of a twelve-man jury, the right to have counsel, and
protections against double jeopardy and self-incriminations.
If there is anything that men have learned as a result of the struggle for
freedom, it is that the destruction of liberty of any individual must in the end
lead to the destruction of liberty for all persons. If democracy is to survive, if
it is to face and conquer the crucial problems of the days ahead, it must
guard these channels of expression without which democracy must wither and
die. To the Supreme Court of the United States has been dedicated this vital
task of safeguarding our civil liberties.4 1
This responsibility gives to the Court a dual task. On the one hand it is
demanded of the Court that it be on the alert constantly for any transgressions
of our most fundamental liberties, while, on the other hand, it is demanded of
this very same Court that it maintain an admirable self-restrailft, lest it inter-
41. "Men have rebelled against arbitrary power because they collided with it in their
work and in the enjoyment of their faculties. So while the constitutional means to liberty
are, in the main, a series of negatives raised against the powerful, the pursuit of liberty is
a great affirmation inspired by the positive energies of the human race." LTPPMANN,
THE GOOD SOcIETY 353 (1943).
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fere with the will of the majority in the solving of the problems of state.42
The Frankfurter school of thought as displayed in recent decisions confuses
the issue by its failure to distinguish between two different functions of the
Court. This difference Was stated rather sharply in the Barnette case when
Mr. Justice Jackson declared:"
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility, may well
include, so far as due process is concerned, power to impose all of the re-
strictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But
freedoms of speech, and of press, and of assembly, and of worship may not
be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect. 43
It is not merely a question of whether state problems are to be solved
locally rather than nationally. 44 Our civil liberties are equally protected from
the tyranny of both local and national governments. Democracy connotes a
sacred area of civil liberties which is safeguarded from the action of both ma-
jorities and minorities.
Now that the Court sees no incompatibility between the rights of a
private property and public control of business enterprise, a similar laissez-
faire attitude toward measures restrictive of civil rights may itself encour-
age intolerance. The Court has an opportunity to contribute to the solution
of a major conundrnm of the twentieth century: Can a government bent on
assuring economic security to the masses be relied on to respect their civil
and political rights.45
CONCLUSION
The Court must guard against allowing itself, as it has but too often al-
lowed itself in the past, from becoming a party to the repressions of our fun-
42. A rather striking and ingenious reconciling of these two conflicting duties of the
Court is offered by Professor Macmahon in the following quotation: "Whatever may be
the future hesitations of the Court amid the dilemma of our time, it can be said generally
of the notable judicial fruitage of recent years that while the Fourteenth Amendment has
been weakened as a substantive restraint on the power of the states to legislate on eco-
nomic matters, it has been given content as a guarantee of civil liberties, including rights
of agitation. . . . In the latter application it is technically a substantive restriction but
in a more fundamental sense the whole structure and method of popular, responsible gov-
ernment-including the right of individual belief, access of information, and use of the
means of group agitation-may be considered a mighty procedure." Macmahon, Taking
Stock of Federalism in the United States, 7 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POL.
Sci. 196, 199 (May 1941).
43. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943).
44. In answering the argument of the majority, in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S.
91 (1945), that local authorities sometimes could not be ielied upon to act because of
prejudices of one sort or another, the minority declared, "If it be significantly true that
crimes against local law cannot be locally prosecuted, it is an ominous sign indeed. In
any event, the cure is a reinvigoration of State responsibility, It is not an undue incursion
of remote federal authorities into local duties with consequent debilitation of local re-
sponsibility." Id. at 160.
45. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT 274 (1945). A pene-
trating and scholarly analysis of the ideological differences that beset the Court at
present is given by the author in Chapters VI and VII.
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damental liberties. It must stand as a citadel of freedom during those times
of strain and stress when hysteria reigns and emotions replace reason. Un-
fortunately, it would appear that the present day decline of judicial review is
not limited exclusively to the field of economics but already has affected the
sphere of civil liberties and promises even further development in the near
future. The fear that the United States Supreme Court will atrophy is indeed
a novel twist to constitutional history, and one which, taking into considera-
tion not only human nature, but judicial nature, may appear to be somewhat
exaggerated. Nevertheless, it would appear that the time is ripe for the Court
to reevaluate its functions test it undo the progress that has been achieved in
protecting personal liberties in the past twenty-five years through the inter-
pretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amnendment.
